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Abstract 
 
As rapid Internet growth continues, global communications becomes more dependent on 
Internet availability for information transfer. Recently, the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) introduced a new protocol, Multiple Protocol Label Switching (MPLS), to provide 
high-performance data flows within the Internet.  MPLS emulates two major aspects of the 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) technology.  First, each initial IP packet is "routed" to 
its destination based on previously known delay and congestion avoidance mechanisms.  This 
allows for effective distribution of network resources and reduces the probability of 
congestion.  Second, after route selection each subsequent packet is assigned a label at each 
hop, which determines the output port for the packet to reach its final destination. These 
labels guide the forwarding of each packet at routing nodes more efficiently and with more 
control than traditional IP forwarding (based on complete address information in each 
packet) for high-performance data flows. 
Label assignment is critical in the prompt and accurate delivery of user data.  However, the 
protocols for label distribution were not adequately secured.  Thus, if an adversary 
compromises a node by intercepting and modifying, or more simply injecting false labels into 
the packet-forwarding engine, the propagation of improperly labeled data flows could create 
instability in the entire network. In addition, some Virtual Private Network (VPN) solutions 
take advantage of this "virtual channel" configuration to eliminate the need for user data 
encryption to provide privacy.  VPN's relying on MPLS require accurate label assignment to 
maintain user data protection.   
This research developed a working distributive trust model that demonstrated how to deploy 
confidentiality, authentication, and non-repudiation in the global network label switching 
control plane. Simulation models and laboratory testbed implementations that demonstrated 
this concept were developed, and results from this research were transferred to industry via 
standards in the Optical Internetworking Forum (OIF). 
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1 Introduction 
MultiProtocol Label Switching (MPLS) is an emerging network protocol that 
provides mechanisms for establishing flows through an Internet Protocol (IP) 
network. These Label Switched Paths (LSPs) allow network operators and users to 
direct traffic through an explicitly defined network path, allowing default traffic 
routes to be overridden if network conditions require it (e.g., network congestion). 
This ability to establish LSPs allows users or network management personnel to 
assign Quality of Service (QoS) attributes, and to perform traffic engineering. 
MPLS LSPs are established in two ways – 1) manually via management access 
protocols, and 2) automatically via label distribution “control plane” protocols. Prior 
to this project, the control plane protocols were minimally secured using 
mechanisms that did not scale well to large networks. As a result, practical 
deployment of MPLS networks did not address security for these control plane 
protocols (this problem also applied to photonic switched networks, which use the 
same MPLS control plane). This lack of security for MPLS control plane protocols is 
problematic because these protocols affect network state, and if the protocol or the 
Label Switched Routers (LSRs) are compromised, then the network can be “taken 
down” by an adversary. 
This project developed a security architecture that addressed the shortcomings of 
the MPLS and optical network control plane protocols. One component of this 
architecture is an IP Security (IPSec) protection profile that provides confidentiality 
and integrity protections for control plane flows between LSRs. The second 
component is a network monitor that monitors control plane protocol actions and 
compares them with the network policy to determine whether violations are 
occurring, and if so, which LSR may be causing the violations. 
Initially, this project developed a network simulation that included both components 
of this architecture. This simulation provided early validation of the architecture’s 
efficacy and scalability, and it also provided a “virtual testbed” for algorithm 
experimentation. Later, this project migrated the simulation implementation into a 
testbed of Linux MPLS LSRs, and a working implementation of the architecture was 
demonstrated by the College Cyberdefenders in August 2003. 
The results from this work were primarily transferred to industry via the Optical 
Internetworking Forum (OIF). The OIF is an industry group that is responsible for 
developing implementation agreements (specifications) for interoperable optical 
networking equipment. In this case, Sandia worked with representatives from 
industry and government to develop IPSec protection profiles for optical control 
plane protocols, and auditing functions for optical switches. In addition, this project 
was partially responsible for licensing to industry related technology for securing 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) control plane protocols. 
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2 MPLS Overview 
MPLS is a method for controlling the flow of IP packets (datagrams) and quickly 
switching them through a network. When standard routers forward IP datagrams, 
they make routing decisions on a per-packet basis using most of the contents 
provided by the IP header. However, datagram switching is much faster than 
routing because it uses a path setup protocol to establish a path through the 
network. Once the path is established, a small flow identifier is added to the packet, 
which allows datagram forwarding by switching hardware rather than route 
lookups.  
MPLS borrows many concepts from ATM, including the ideas of path switching, 
dynamic flow setup, and support for traffic engineering. The following sections 
describe these architectural concepts in more detail. 
2.1 MPLS architecture 
MPLS is a set of Internet specifications that describes interoperable mechanisms for 
implementing IP switching. An example of using MPLS for IP switching is shown in 
Figure 1. MPLS Label Switching Routers (LSRs) switch IP datagrams over a Label 
Switched Path (LSP) that traverses an MPLS Domain. The LSP is established 
manually via management access or via signaling.  
Label-switching
router
(LSR1)
End System
IP Router
LSR2
LSR3
LSR4 IP Router End System
Label-switched
path
(LSP)
MPLS Domain
 
Figure 1: Label switching example 
 
Switching on an LSP is supported by a label affixed to the IP packet by an MPLS 
ingress LSR (LSR1 in Figure 1), and the label is removed by the egress LSR (LSR4 
in Figure 1) when the datagram leaves the MPLS domain. Whereas conventional IP 
routing looks at the IP header to make forwarding decisions, MPLS forwarding 
decisions are based on a small label affixed to the packet in a “shim header” between 
the IP and the link layer protocol (e.g., Ethernet MAC) headers. This label is 
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assigned to the packet’s Forwarding Equivalence Class (FEC), which in practice, is a 
network prefix. Therefore, all packets belonging to the same FEC (i.e., having the 
same destination address prefix) are assigned the same label, and are switched 
along the same LSP. Labels may be unique to the LSR interface (interface label 
space), or unique to all interfaces on the LSR (platform label space). 
LSRs may be physically or logically adjacent. If LSRs are logically adjacent, then 
they are connected through another LSP or through a special tunnel, resulting in a 
hierarchy of LSPs, as shown in Figure 2. This hierarchy allows the MPLS network to 
scale, and also allows end-to-end MPLS switching through different administrative 
domains. 
 
Public
Network
LSR2 LSR3LSR1
LSR22LSR21
LSR4
End System End System
11 1
2
1
1
2
LSR 2 and LSR 3 are
logically adjacent
Level 2 LSP
Level 1 LSP
 
Figure 2: Nested LSPs and logical adjacency 
 
LSPs may be configured manually or via signaling, and like ATM virtual circuits or 
virtual paths, LSPs allow traffic engineering. This permits a network operator to 
override the automatic path that a packet would take (i.e., one determined by 
normal IP routing), and send the packet through one that is configured via 
management. Standard IP routed networks also support traffic engineering, but it is 
based on source routing, which has security and efficiency issues. Therefore, MPLS 
is considered a better solution for engineering traffic flows in a backbone network. 
When LSPs are configured via signaling, a label distribution protocol is required to 
allow LSRs to inform other LSRs of bindings between FECs and labels. The binding 
between a FEC and a label is normally determined by the downstream LSR and 
communicated to the upstream LSR via signaling. Once communicated, the 
signaling protocol is used to maintain the binding and tear it down when it is no 
longer needed. As described below, multiple protocols for label distribution are 
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defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force, including the Label Distribution 
Protocol with extensions for Constraint Routing (CR-LDP) and the Resource 
Reservation Protocol with extensions for Traffic Engineering (RSVP-TE), with 
RSVP-TE emerging as the dominant protocol. 
2.2 Signaling label-switched paths 
MPLS does not specify a particular protocol for disseminating FEC-label bindings in 
a network of LSRs. However, there are two fundamental approaches that can be 
taken. The first approach is to take an existing label distribution protocol and 
extend it to support resource reservations and explicit routing (which in turn 
supports traffic engineering). The most common protocol that adopts this approach 
is CR-LDP. The second approach is to take an existing resource reservation protocol 
and extend it to support explicit routing and labels, and is most commonly 
represented by RSVP-TE. In this paper, the term LDP is used to refer to CR-LDP, 
RSVP refers to RSVP-TE, and the term “label distribution protocol” refers to the 
generic signaling protocol that distributes labels.  
In general, a label distribution protocol allows two LSRs to agree on the meaning of 
labels used to forward traffic between them. This allows the creation, maintenance, 
and deletion of LSPs within the network.  
When RSVP is used to distribute FEC-label bindings, special RSVP extension 
objects are used to carry MPLS labels in the RSVP PATH and RESV messages. In 
addition, routing protocols such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) can also be used 
to distribute labels. When BGP is used to distribute a route, it also distributes a 
label for that route. This method can also work with route reflectors. 
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3 MPLS Control Plane Threat Analysis 
 
The first step in the development of a security approach in a network environment is 
to define an appropriate threat model.  The following is the description of 
adversarial threats considered when designing our security architecture.   
The network under consideration is owned and controlled by single entity. The 
ingress/egress nodes are the nodes that are in physical communication with nodes in 
another network. The transit nodes can only communicate with other network 
nodes.  
The adversary may have three goals for manipulation of signaling messages. 
1. The adversary wishes to obtain network messages because the data content has 
value to the adversary. 
2. The adversary wishes to do traffic analysis. 
3. The adversary wishes to degrade the capability of the network. 
Any money obtained from QoS considerations goes to the owner of the network. An 
adversary will not realize any direct financial benefit (derived from QoS 
considerations) from a malicious reroute. For instance, if the adversary manipulates 
flows so that high quality and value flows are routed through a particular node, the 
network owner will not pay him for his work. If he helps the overall throughput if 
the network, he probably is not considered an adversary. His only motivation, from a 
QoS sense, is to harm the overall throughput of the network.   
We assume that the control channel is secured through some sort of link-by-link 
security feature. An adversary may view and/or delete any control message, but any 
altered message will be discarded. As such the adversary may sever physically or 
logically any control link that appears in the network that he can gain access to. We 
assume that to manipulate further the control messages the adversary must 
compromise one or more nodes. Note however, that if one can take only the word of 
the two link ends, it may not be possible to tell if a disruption is generated at one 
end of a link, in the middle of the link, or the other end of the link. 
3.1 Data Content has Value 
Suppose that an adversary wishes to attain specific data flows because the data 
content has value to the adversary. To get hold of the data, the adversary may sit 
and hope the data happens to pass through his hands or he must devise a way to 
draw the data to himself.  
If the adversary has access to the communication channel at a particular spot in the 
network, there is a certain probability that the data will pass through the link that 
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he is monitoring. In order to increase that probability the adversary must either 
gain access to another and/or better link or the adversary must compromise a node.  
If we assume that a node has been compromised, there are several ways to increase 
the probability that the sought after data passes through his hands. The following is 
an incomplete list. 
1. A node may generate traffic roughly orthogonal to the flow of the desired traffic. 
If ingress nodes make path decisions based on the actual, available, reported 
bandwidth, then the extra traffic may cause the ingress node to route around the 
blockage and through the compromised node. This idea works well provided that 
the network topology is planar in nature. On the other hand if the topology is 
non planar, the compromised node may have to swamp several flows to 
effectively block more logical paths. If route decisions are based on bandwidth 
that is left over after QoS commitments, then this may not work as described 
unless the links in the path are saturated and cannot forward any additional 
traffic. In this case, the ingress node may keep trying other paths until one work. 
2. A compromised node may advertise false routing information. It may advertise 
that it has much more available bandwidth than it actually has. This will tip the 
scales in its favor.  
A particular compromised node may not have the resources to process the desired 
data. It may need to forward the data to another compromised node or some other 
node out of the network so that it can be saved and/or processed there. Either the 
compromised node reroutes the traffic through the other node or else makes a copy 
of the data and sends the original on its way and the copy to the other node. In the 
latter case, no signaling rule need be violated in order to copy and pass the data. All 
that is required is that at some time in the past the node with the desired data was 
legitimately in communication with the node that it wants to pass the data to. The 
compromised node must keep the path alive somehow and pass data along the 
legitimate path when it is needed. In the case that the path is active with legitimate 
data, the compromised node may append collected data to the legitimate flow. The 
recipient node may strip it off when received. If the data rate of the desired 
information is not too high when compared to the legitimate data, this covert 
channel has little chance of being detected. 
The desire of the adversary is to acquire certain data, and as mentioned above, he 
may also be able to sniff the data channel on which the data normally flows rather 
than compromise a particular node. 
In all cases, the best fix is for the end users to set up a secure tunnel to protect the 
data. If the end users do not protect the confidentiality of their data, it is not the 
network’s responsibility to do it for them; it does not own the data. (There may be an 
argument about the network’s responsibility to ensure the integrity of the data that 
it routes.) Unless the end users request confidentiality, a forwarding network has 
little incentive to provide it. If the confidentiality service is an option, then the end 
users will likely be willing to pay for it both monetarily and in throughput because of 
processing delays.  
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It must be clear that as long as the user plane data remains in the clear, there may 
be an adversary motivated to manipulate the control data in order to attain user 
data. Any such manipulations are likely to degrade the overall throughput of the 
network, which in turn affects the bottom line of the network. It appears that the 
only way to remove such a temptation to the adversary is to encrypt the data from 
ingress node to egress node. However, such an endeavor comes at a cost in overall 
network performance. A network must weigh that cost against the expected 
degradation in performance associated with reroutes because an adversary desires 
data content.   
Finally, it is not reasonable to assume that an adversary will reroute encrypted 
traffic so that it can be saved for a later time so that it can be decrypted at a later 
time. If the adversary has the ability to break a well implemented, solid cipher, it 
will have the resources to do just about anything else to the network. 
3.2 Traffic Analysis 
Traffic analysis is an attempt to gain information about the network in which the 
traffic flows. This information is independent of the data that flows may contain. 
Typical analysis will seek to understand how traffic flows through the network, 
determine critical nodes, and critical network paths, etc. When the network has a 
fairly flat nodal job description, global traffic analysis makes little sense. Often the 
form and function of every node is known to begin with. For instance, if the job of 
every node in the network is to route and forward traffic, little can be gained by 
watching the network to see what happens.  Further, to accomplish this type of 
analysis one must have access to data produced throughout the network. That can 
be accomplished with many sensors or with access to a collection point such as a 
network monitor. 
When discussing traffic analysis it is important to understand what network the 
adversary is attempting to analyze. An adversary may have no interest in analyzing 
the network that employs MPLS. He may really be interested in analyzing a 
network whose end users reside outside of the MPLS network, yet use the MPLS 
network to assist in their communications. The adversary may desire to monitor the 
target network traffic as it passes through the MPLS network. If he must forward 
the information to another node, then (generally) he forwards less information than 
is contained in the original data. In any event, the user-plane traffic need not be 
rerouted.  
In some instances the adversary may not have access to the flows that he desires to 
analyze. In this case, he must draw the flows to himself. This can be accomplished 
with exactly the same means that he might use to draw data to himself because the 
data content has value. He may do this even if the data portion of the flows is 
encrypted, because the goal of traffic analysis has nothing to do with the data 
encrypted or not. If the end users desire that their traffic not be analyzed they must 
specify explicit routes and hope that these routes do not happen to contain a 
compromised node and that no link in between is being monitored.  
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The MPLS network may not care that an adversary desires to analyze traffic from 
another network except that reroutes are likely to negatively affect network 
performance. Since, at worst, a compromised node need only forward condensed flow 
information, it need not reroute flows it already has. It is only in the case that a 
node needs flows that it does not already have that it would attempt to subvert 
control information. There are several options to prevent traffic analysis, however 
these all come at a price. As with the confidentiality problems above, the MPLS 
network may not have any real incentive to remove the problem.  
3.3 Denial of Service 
An adversary that desires to harm the network by degrading its performance has 
many options. These options include physical attacks on the equipment, user-plane 
attacks, as well as control plane attacks. We will not discuss physical attacks 
further. 
If the adversary has access to the channel, he has the ability to modify and/or delete 
any data found in the channel. This is true regardless of any cryptographic security 
mechanisms applied to the data that is being sent. With access to the channel the 
adversary is able to sever the link he has access to. Presumably, when a link is 
restricted or shut down, traffic will, if possible, be rerouted around the trouble spot. 
Nodes close to the downed link will see an increased amount of traffic and 
congestion. Even though this type of attack is difficult to mitigate, the effects are 
fairly local in nature. 
If the adversary has access to the user-plane channel he may also have access to the 
control-plane channel. We assume that the data in the control-plane channel is 
secured, so the adversary cannot interject unauthenticated messages into the 
channel. However, all received control messages must pass through computationally 
intensive authentication processes. By sending a flood of bogus control messages 
each of which have to be processed the adversary may be able to shut down the 
control-plane of the nodes he has access to. If a node is unable to process legitimate 
control messages it will eventually loose its ability to correctly process user-plane 
data.  
Because the intent of MPLS is to efficiently switch datagrams through the network, 
cryptographic security means probably will not be applied to the switching 
information in the packet headers. This means that an adversary with access to the 
channel will be able to modify the switching information to send packets down 
wrong LSPs. The adversary may modify information deeper in the packet that only 
the egress node would be able to detect, or information that only the end user could 
be able to detect. In any of these cases, the corrupt information may pass through 
the network before it is detected as corrupt. Which in turn may initiate a resend of 
the information and thus the network’s overall performance is degraded. The effects 
of these attacks are felt throughout the network as corrupt packets are forwarded 
through the network. 
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Since the switched packets are not authenticated en route, the adversary with 
channel access may generate locally valid looking packets to the full capacity of the 
channel. The falsely generated packets may progress through the network in any 
number of ways.  
Thus far in this section we have described situations where the adversary is able to 
disrupt network operation without ever compromising a node. Further, the DoS 
mechanisms described above are independent of the security features applied at the 
control-plane. Because, there is no hope that a secure control plane will be able to 
prevent all denial or degradation of service attacks, one must be careful to 
understand the overall impacts of security mechanisms applied to the control-plane. 
If a node is compromised, the adversary will certainly have the ability to accomplish 
any DoS attack describe thus far, but will also have additional abilities. If an ingress 
node is compromised, it may generate traffic of any sort, at will. It may flood the 
control plane of the entire network with bogus messages. It may reserve very high 
bandwidth, very high priority, and very explicit circuitous routes. On the more 
subtle side, a compromised ingress node may just bump up the bandwidth 
reservation requirements of all valid flows by a certain percentage. It may choose 
the worst, but still within tolerance paths. One compromised ingress node may 
completely shut down the entire network. This can happen independent of any 
additional control-plane security mechanisms applied. These must be hardened to 
the highest level. 
Compromised transit nodes may wreak havoc as well. If the route set-up messages 
are not globally authenticated, a transit node may mimic an ingress node and 
generate very high bandwidth, very high priority, and very explicit circuitous routes. 
This will have just as serious of an effect on the network as when an ingress node 
generates the false requests. However, there are security mechanisms that can be 
applied to stop this behavior, if the network is willing to pay the price. A network 
monitor may be able to track down the origin of the bad behavior, but simple 
monitoring will not prevent that behavior. 
3.4 Threat Summary 
This project addresses the detection/isolation of MPLS label switched routers (LSRs) 
that have been compromised. A compromised LSR can be used to do the following: 
1. Establish unauthorized label switched paths (LSPs). An LSP that advertises 
connectivity to an IP subnet can be re-routed in manner that allows 
examination of traffic. 
2. Advertise false routing information or LSP/label mappings. Not only does this 
facilitate re-routing, but it also corrupts correct routing of LSPs, resulting in 
denial of service. 
Also important is a consideration of what is not in the threat model. This project is 
not concerned with protection of the inter-LSR control plane channels, as this 
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protection is provided by conventional IPSec mechanisms, as described in the 
Architecture section below. However, even with IPSec mechanisms in place on the 
control plane connections, compromise of LSR’s is still possible, e.g., unauthorized 
management access using inadequately protected passwords. In addition, erroneous 
LSR operation may also occur if the LSR has been inserted correctly, but configured 
incorrectly. 
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4 Security Approach 
This project developed mechanisms to allow global (within a BGP routing domain) 
monitoring of LSP creation and deletion events. With global monitoring, the 
following can be detected: 
1. LSP establishment that is contrary to domain policy. If an LSR is 
compromised, and it attempts to establish LSPs in an unauthorized manner, 
then the neighboring LSRs will report LSP establishment events to a global 
LSP monitor. The monitor will compare these events against a policy 
database and a routing topology database to determine if the LSP is 
unauthorized. 
2. Label advertisements that are contrary to domain policy and/or current 
network state (this is closely related to item # 1). When an LSR receives a 
label advertisement, it will notify the global LSP monitor. The monitor will 
compare these advertisements against the LSP policy database and the 
topology database to determine deviations. 
3. Collusion between two or more LSPs (and identify which LSPs are involved). 
This approach relies on the correlation of events from uncompromised routers 
to determine if an intrusion has occurred. If two or more LSPs are colluding, 
then they can report false events to the monitor in an attempt to mask the 
unauthorized behavior. The monitor will compare LSP and label distribution 
protocol (LDP) events to determine whether unauthorized activity is 
occurring, and which LSPs are involved. 
This project developed a proof-of-concept architecture for monitoring MPLS control 
plane events. This architecture was implemented and simulated in the OPNET 
network simulation package. New algorithms for detection of unauthorized behavior 
with respect to LSP policy and routing topology state were also developed and 
implemented in the OPNET simulation. In addition, algorithms for detection of 
collusion between multiple LSRs were examined during the initial study phase, with 
emphasis given to solutions of the “Byzantine Generals Problem”.  
An OPNET simulation model was developed and used to evaluate the system 
according to the following metrics: 
1. Network traffic overhead. The overhead associated with the extra 
encapsulation headers for IPSec control channel protection, key exchange 
protocol messages, and LSP/LDP event notifications. 
2. Latency associated with establishment of legitimate LSPs. If the monitor 
must be in the loop, then a delay will be incurred in the establishment of 
LSPs. 
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3. Load on LSP monitor. Incoming event messages from a network of LSRs to a 
centralized LSP monitor will cause processing load on the monitor. As the 
number of LSRs increases, so will the load. 
4.1 Security Architecture 
The architecture for the proof of concept system is illustrated in Figure 3. 
In this architecture, the control channels that link each of the LSRs are secured 
using IPSec. Also, each LSR is configured with the address of the Policy Control 
monitor, and sends path notifications to it over an IPSec-protected channel.  
A Policy Control monitor is configured to receive path notification messages from the 
LSRs over IPSec-secured links. Upon arrival of the path notifications, the monitor 
examines a Path Setup Policy database and a Network Topology database to 
determine whether the incoming path notifications are consistent with policy. (Note: 
traffic engineering may require that a path be setup in a manner that is not 
consistent with the current network topology. In this case, only the Path Setup 
Policy database is consulted.) 
The Policy Control monitor uses the incoming path notifications to determine 
whether an LSP is authorized, and if not, it determines which LSR is compromised. 
Figure 3: Proof-of-concept architecture 
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If multiple LSRs are compromised and colluding, then the monitor detects which 
LSRs are involved. 
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5 Security Protocol Implementation 
Our security mechanism provides a method of monitoring Multi-Protocol Label 
Switching (MPLS) for proper operation in an adversarial environment.  MPLS is a 
set of standards for IP switching which are designed to provide low-latency, and 
differentiated transfer services of IP datagram flows across an MPLS domain.  
MPLS does not provide security mechanisms that assure proper network operation. 
An MPLS control plane signaling protocol called Resource Reservation Protocol with 
Traffic Engineering (RSVP-TE) governs the setup and control of these flows. This 
MPLS control plane signaling protocol has been specified in the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) in a series of Request For Comments (RFCs) and 
will become an important set of protocols for IP data transfer in enterprise core 
networks as well as the Internet. 
This MPLS control plane protocol is susceptible to exploitation by adversaries 
attempting to create Denial of Service (DOS) situations and unauthorized Quality of 
Service (QoS) gains.  This  RSVP-TE Control Plane Monitor (RCPM), which resides 
on participating Label Edge Router’s (LERs) and a standalone monitor platform, can 
provide detection and isolation of Label Switched Routers (LSRs) that have been 
compromised. A compromised LSR can be used to do the following: 
1. Establish unauthorized Label Switched Paths (LSP’s). An LSP that 
advertises connectivity to an IP subnet can be re-routed in a manner that 
allows examination of traffic. 
2. Advertise false routing information or LSP/label mappings. Not only does this 
facilitate re-routing, but it also corrupts correct routing of LSP’s, resulting in 
denial of service. 
3. Modify quality of service attributes to either increase or decrease the 
authorized quality of service for a specified flow. This can also create a denial 
of service scenario by disallowing the establishment of a LSP due to an 
excessive service subscription request.  
4. Tear down authorized Label Switch Paths by injecting unauthorized path 
and reservation (RESV) tear down messages. 
The RCPM is not concerned with protection of the inter-LSR control plane channels, 
as this protection can be provided by conventional IPSec mechanisms, although even 
without this protection the RCPM can detect modification of LSP control messages 
that occur on any RCPM participating LSR to LSR inter-link connection.  However, 
even with IPSec mechanisms in place on the inter-link control plane connections, 
compromise of LSR’s are still possible, e.g., adversarial compromise of control plane 
code residing on an LSR, unauthorized management access using inadequately 
protected passwords. In addition, erroneous LSR operation may also occur if the 
LSR has been inserted correctly, but configured incorrectly.  The RCPM function can 
detect these types of adversarial attacks and mis-configurations. 
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The RCPM has developed mechanisms to allow global (within a BGP routing 
domain) monitoring of LSP creation and deletion events. With global monitoring, the 
following can be detected: 
1. LSP establishment that is contrary to domain policy. If an LSR is 
compromised, and it attempts to establish LSPs in an unauthorized 
manner, then the neighboring LSRs will report LSP establishment events 
to the global LSP monitor. The monitor will compare these events against 
a policy database to determine if the LSP is unauthorized.  
2. Collusion between two or more LSPs (and identify which LSPs are 
involved). This approach relies on the correlation of events from un-
compromised routers to determine if an intrusion has occurred. If two or 
more LSPs are colluding, then they can report false events to the monitor 
in an attempt to mask the unauthorized behavior. The monitor will 
compare LSP and Label Distribution Protocol (LDP) events to determine 
whether unauthorized activity is occurring, and which LSPs are involved. 
3. Unauthorized LSP tear down request. The RCPM can detect and track 
the path and reservation tear down message as they propagate through 
the network.  
4. Unauthorized quality of service request that are contrary to the 
appropriate Forward equivalency Class (FEC) mappings assigned at the 
Ingress of the network. The RCPM can detect tampering of the assigned 
QoS attributes of an LSP. 
5. Traffic engineered routes that are unauthorized or have been modified 
from their initial path. Detection of explicit route and record route object 
modifications. 
The RCPM has a reporting function that is installed on participating Label Switch 
Routers. This reporting function sends a copy of the LSP setup request message that 
is being transmitted through the network in real time as part of the LSP setup 
procedure.  The LSP setup messages are comprised of two parts; a PATH setup 
message that originates at the Ingress of a network on a LER and is transmitted 
through the network hop by hop being processed by each appropriate LSR until it 
terminates at the Egress, and a RESV message, which is a response to a PATH 
message, that originates at the Egress of the network on an Label Edge Router 
(LER) and terminates at the originating ingress LER. Messages sent to the monitor 
provide a real time monitoring capability for the monitoring software that resides on 
the monitor platform. The monitor platform can provide LSP tamper detection for an 
entire domain of LSP routers. Figure 4 shows the communication process between 
participating LSP routers and the Monitor. 
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5.1 Message Processing 
As the LSP signaling process begins a path message is sent from the “Ingress router” 
LER of the   originating node to the “Egress router” LER of the terminating node. As 
the LER processes this message and sends it out to the next hop router, it also sends 
this same message to the monitor through a protected IPsec or equivalent VPN 
tunnel that each participating router establishes with the monitor.  The VPN 
tunnels are needed to prevent/detect manipulations of message traffic to the 
monitor. The setup and control of these tunnels are easier to maintain than the link-
to-link establishment that would be needed for a traditional implementation of 
inter-link protection as discussed earlier.  As the monitor receives the first message 
sent from the Ingress router it identifies the originator of the message, the message 
type, PATH  or RESV message, and which LSP this message pertains too. It then 
extracts the message object fields that will be used for comparison and temporarily 
stores these field values. As additional message arrive from routers reporting the 
setup of this LSP, the monitor compares each appropriate message pair from each 
router and makes a real-time or near real time decision on the validity of the 
message object fields.  When the monitor receives the last monitor message for the 
LSP being monitored it releases the resources that were needed for processing the 
incoming message, thus allowing resources to be utilized by other incoming 
messages.  
For example, as seen in Figure 4, the first message sent to the monitor would be from 
the “Ingress router A” port 2 as it forwards the LSP setup request downstream to 
the next hop router LSR  “B” port 1. The LSR B port 1 would then receive this 
message from the upstream LER “A” port 2 and forward this message to the monitor 
it would then process the message before sending it out on port 2 to the monitor and 
also forwarding it downstream to the terminating “Egress router C” port 1. When 
LER  “C” receives the message it also forwards a copy of the message to the monitor 
and than processes the terminating PATH message. The “Egress router” LER  “C” 
port 1 then launches an associated RESV message upstream to the “Ingress route” 
that originated the initial path message. This RESV message is transmitted to the 
“Ingress router” LER  “A” in the reverse order that it was received. Along the way, 
each node sends a copy of this RESV message to the monitor for security processing. 
The monitor receives each one of the subsequent messages and just like the PATH 
message processing it uses a compare algorithm that determines if any of the 
message object fields have been changed. If field tampering is detected, it can then 
be reported immediately or logged for later review.  
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Figure 4: Monitored MPLS Network 
 
5.2 Architecture Simulation 
To validate the protocol design a node model was constructed using a network 
communications simulator.  The modeling software used to provide the simulation 
was OPNET Modeler release 8.0.c and is copyright protected by OPNET 
Technologies, Inc. 
OPNET simulations are event-driven.  The simulation kernel maintains a single 
global event list, time in the simulation advances when an event occurs.  All objects 
access a shared simulation clock and all events are scheduled on the list in time 
order.  When an event is completed it is removed from the list.  An event becomes an 
interrupt when it reaches the head of the event list and is delivered by the 
simulation kernel to the designated module.  The module can obtain any data 
associated with the event when the interrupt occurs.   
A node is a collection of interconnected modules in which data is manipulated as 
defined by the modules themselves.  Modules represent the internal capabilities of a 
node such as data creation, transmission, processing, internal routing, reception, 
storage and queuing.  Within the  OPNET Node editor a variety of different modules 
can be accessed.  The modules are used to model some aspect of node behavior.  A 
single node model is usually comprised of multiple modules.  The modules are 
connected together by packet streams and statistic wires.  Packet streams are used 
to transport data between the modules while statistic wires allow one module to 
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monitor a varying quantity within another module.  The ability to integrate the  use 
of modules, packet streams, and statistic wires allow the developer to create highly 
realistic simulations of node behavior. 
5.2.1 Security Design 
As previously mentioned in section 3.0 Security Protocol Implementation, MPLS is 
governed by a control protocol called resource Reservation Protocol with Traffic 
Engineering (RSVP-TE).  This protocol is used to setup all Label Switched Paths 
within the MPLS domain and therefore presumed to be subject to adversarial 
compromise.  To build a security mechanism that could detect unauthorized changes 
and manipulations within this protocol, modifications were needed to the source 
code of the protocol itself.   
The OPNET simulation software has a module called “RSVP” that represents this 
signaling protocol.  This “RSVP” module is contained within many represented 
communication objects in OPNET’s “object palette”.  The objects chosen for our 
security implementation include, Ethernet Workstations, Ethernet Switches, 
Ethernet Servers, LER IP Routers, and LSR IP Routers.  Within these object models 
are process models that represent specific supported functions within the object. One 
of these process modules represents the signaling protocol that implements MPLS.  
It is referred to as RSVP.  Figure 5 shows the LER IP node module and all its 
associated process models. 
 
Figure 5: OPNET Label Edge Router Model 
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All modifications to the RSVP signaling control plane software are in reference to 
the RSVP process model except for the Modifications located within the ip_encap 
process block.  Modifications within this process block allow RSVP packets, 
originating from each router node interface, to be routed to the monitor station for 
processing.  All RSVP packets originating from the RSVP process module are 
identified by “type’ field located within the packet itself.  This type identification 
triggered the ip_encap process block to disregard a standard IP routing table lookup 
for information pertaining to the routing of the RSVP packet.  Because RSVP 
packets utilize a field that is populated by IP addresses of each RSVP participation 
node, route lookup is not needed to forward the packet to its next hop. Because a 
copy of this packet was sent to the monitor it had to use the standard route “lookup” 
process to allow the packet to reach its destination (the monitor).  To accomplish this 
function a new type identifier was created and inserted within the RSVP packets 
destined to the monitor station.  This allowed the ip_encap process to discriminate 
between the RSVP standard forwarding packet and the RSVP route lookup packet 
destined to the security monitor.  
 
5.2.2 RSVP Process Model 
The RSVP process model is comprised of all the logic modules needed to emulate the 
signaling protocol.  Different logic states are defined to allow the simulators event 
based structure to process events in a user defined manner.  Figure 6 shows all the 
processing logic blocks associated with the RSVP process model. 
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Figure 6: RSVP Model 
 
Within OPNET there are several layers that are associated with each object.  These 
layers, described below provide the designer with a different function.  The following 
is a quick description for use of RSVP in OPNET’s MPLS simulations: 
1. Path, Send_Label, Resv, and Send_LRO are all of the “states” within the rsvp  
“process model” that have modified code. The rsvp process model also has two 
new state blocks added, a monitor block and a monitor tear block. 
2. There are only three objects that use RSVP - they are the Routers, Servers, 
and Workstations. 
3. The levels of the OPNET program are as follows: Project –> Object –> Node 
Model –> Process Model –> State Block.  The state block is where the code 
resides that has been modified. 
4. The node models that are used within the objects are as follows, and each 
contain the modified code which resides in the rsvp process located in the 
node model: 
 
Object                                    Node Model 
Label Edge Routers  ethernet2_slip8_ler 
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Workstation   workstation_adv 
Server   server_adv 
To accomplish our goal of building a secure MPLS signaling protocol 
modifications/additions to some of the software based process modules needed to be 
made.  The procedures for the modifications were built based on the sequential order 
of the signal ing protocol itself.  The first module to be modified was the Send_LRO 
module.  The Send_LRO module is responsible for the initiation of a signaling 
request.  This request is initiated from the Ingress router and launches the PATH 
setup message for a Label Switch Path (LSP). 
The Send LRO state is entered when the corresponding Node is an Ingress LER for 
at least one LSP. In this state, set up all the LSPs originating from this node:  
1. Find all the LSPs originating from this node. 
2. For all LSPs get the constraints and Explicit route. 
3. Create the PATH message with LABEL_REQUEST object. 
4. Create a corresponding Path state. 
5. Invoke route query to find the list of outgoing interfaces for the path 
message, and copy them into the path state. 
6. Execute Path refresh sequence. This sequence sends path messages to all 
outgoing interfaces defined in step 2. 
This PATH message is sent node-to- node from the Ingress to the Egress of the 
network.  This PATH message contains the following “fields of information” referred 
to as objects, that pertain to the setup of the LSP. 
Label Request Object------ request a label binding, along with label type and label 
range be associated   with the LSP 
Explicit Route Object------ predefines an explicit hop-by-hop route from the Ingress 
router through the network to the Egress, independent of standard IP routing 
protocols. 
Record Route Object------ this field is populated by each router that is participating 
in the LSP setup.  The IP address of each subsequent node is recorded on its way to 
the Egress router. 
Session Attribute Object----- defines the session type of the LSP Ipv4 or IP v6 ,and 
preemption capability of the specified for the LSP 
CoS Flowspec Object------- defines specific attributes of the requested data flow such 
as inter-packet delay and minimum bandwidth the LSP needs to provide. 
 30
It’s these object fields the MPLS security monitor protects.  To provide this 
protection each link associated with the setup of LSP reports path information that 
it processes and forwards to downstream routers.  It also reports all resv message 
information that it receives from upstream routers to the security monitor. 
The “PATH” state block provides the following message processing activity. Upon 
the reception of a PATH setup message, the message type is determined. If the 
message is “RSVP with label request” a matching path state is found, or if there is 
none, it is created. If there is a matching state, its content is updated. Any change in 
forwarding path state will trigger immediate generation of updated Path messages.  
To maintain a local node consistency, the modification of Path states can also result 
in the modification of reservation states, and possibly traffic control states, and 
reservation update. In that case reservation refresh messages are sent out 
immediately. There is one path state for each (sender, destination, incoming 
interface) triple. Since RSVP supports multicast applications, the node may receive 
more the same session will be used for forwarding Path messages downstream. It 
will be a state created by a message that arrived on an interface expected by routing. 
This state will have its local_only flag set to off, and will be referred to as 
"forwarding_state".      
Three variables of the type RsvpT_Path_State* are used to process the message: 
path_state_ptr  denotes a general path state that was found 
matching_path_state_ptr  denotes a matching state for an arrived path message 
forwarding_path_state_ptr  denotes a forwarding path state for the session and 
sender for the message. 
Two flags are used to identify whether the reception of the message changes existing 
states. In a case of a change refresh messages will be sent out immediately. The 
flags are:  
1. path_refresh_needed - if turned on, path state will be refreshed. 
2. resv_refresh_needed - if turned on, resv state will be refreshed   
EVENT SEQUENCE: (based on RFC 2209):      
1. Find a matching path state and determine whether it is a forwarding state. If 
a matching state does not exist, create it.  
2. Update the soft state lifetime timer of the matching state. 
3. Contact routing to find expected incoming and outgoing interfaces for the 
session. Determine whether the matching state is a forwarding state.  
4. If forwarding path state is new or modified, execute path refresh sequence to 
maintain local state node consistency; this sequence may turn on resv refresh 
flag, which will trigger the execution of reservation refresh sequence. 
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  Within the Send_LRO and PATH block software function prototypes were created 
and code modifications were made to create the PATH message security reporting 
capability.  The following shows a typical code block that performs the forwarding of 
a PATH setup message to the security monitor. 
 
/* send path message to monitor */ 
printf (“SENDING OUT INITIAL PATH MESSAGE TO MONITOR \n\n”) 
d = d+1; 
printf (“This is the [%d] path message send \n”, d); 
packet_fields pointer->sender_nd_objid = node_objid; 
printf (“The node object that sent this is: %d \n”, node_object); 
moitor_addr = ip_address_create (“192.0.2.2”); 
rsvp_monitor_path_send (path_state_ptr, RsvpC_Monitor_path, 
OPC_INT_INVALID, iface_table_ptr, refresh_timer, LTRACE_PATH || 
LTRACE_MESG, monitor_addr); 
 
Along with protecting the PATH setup message the security component would not be 
complete without also protecting the subsequent RSVP “RESV” signaling messages.  
The RESV message contains the following data objects that are associated with the 
setup of a LSP. 
Label Object------ Performs the upstream on demand label distribution process  
Record Route Object------ Returns the LSPs path to the sender of the PATH message, 
also use to find hop-by-hop route back to Ingress 
Session Object------ Uniquely identifies the LSP being established 
Style Object----- Specifies the reservation style and filter type of the LSP  
The RESV function is associated within the Resv and Send_Label process blocks.  
The Resv state processes received reservation message and resv request from a local 
application. 
EVENT SEQUENCE: 
1. If a message was received, determine the interface on which it arrived.  
2. Make sure that there is a matching path state. If there is no matching path 
state, send RERR message.  
3. Check for incompatible styles with existing resv states for the same session. 
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4. Process flow descriptor from the message or from the down call to make 
reservations. Each flow descriptor is processed separately. a) if there is a 
matching path state for the message, add its incoming interface into the list 
of interfaces for which resv refresh will be performed. b) Find or create a 
reservation state and update it. Any change will turn new_or_modified flag 
on. c) If the new or modified flag is on, execute update traffic control 
sequence. This may modify the existing traffic control states and the 
reservations in place. If the result is to modify traffic control states, this 
sequence will turn on resv refresh needed flag. 
5. If resv refresh needed flag is on, execute resv refresh sequence (e.g refresh 
the states) for each PHOP in the list of interfaces created in 4. 
6. Drop the resv message and return. 
 
The send label state is entered after an Egress LER of an LSP receives RSVP Path 
message along with Label_Request object.  
EVENT SEQUENCE: 
1. Get the Path state made when this PATH Message was received. 
2. Get the Information about LSP for which this PATH Message was sent. 
3. Make a reservation decision by finding the reservation parameters from LSPs 
TE Parameters. 
4. Form the Label Object. 
5. Make and Send Reserve request message along with the LABEL object  
 Function prototypes have been designed and inserted in the appropriate locations in 
the code block to forward all RESV message traffic origination and forwarding 
through the MPLS nodes participating in the setup of an LSP.  The following 
displays a typical code block that forwards a RESV message to the security monitor. 
 
/* send the packet to the monitor */ 
printf (“SENDING OUT INITIAL RESV MESSAGE TO MONITOR \n\n”) 
packet_fields pointer->sender_nd_objid = node_objid; 
printf (“The node object that sent this is: %d \n”, node_object); 
moitor_addr = ip_address_create (“192.0.2.2”); 
rsvp_monitor_send (packet_fields_ptr, my_ip_address, monitor_addr, 
out_intf_index, next_hop_address); 
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5.2.3 Security Monitor 
The overall security approach utilizes a link-by-link analysis of signaling 
information.  It starts with the first PATH message generated from the Ingress 
router and ends when the Igress router receives the final RESV message.  Any 
message objects that are deleted, changed, or manipulated are detected and reported 
at the security monitor.  The code that performs this message signaling verification 
resides in a newly created logic module called “Monitor” and is part of the RSVP 
process model as seen in Figure 6. 
The codes primary structure is built around temporarily storing LSP PATH and 
RESV object information that has been sent by each link of the MPLS participating 
routers. It starts the analyses by first determining the LSP message type, either 
PATH or RESV.  This allows the code to direct packets to the appropriate section in 
code for processing. 
For PATH message processing the code stores the node (router) ID and the LSP 
object ID used for status reporting.  It then stores the CoS flowspec object which 
contains the QOS bandwidth variable and the QOS time delay variable. It also 
stores the explicit route object, which contains directed path information for the 
LSP. As each subsequent router link reports its LSP signaling PATH information 
the monitor compares the information shared between any two interconnected 
router links to determine if the information that was sent was the same information 
that was received. Information that has been tampered with by a man-in-the-middle 
is quickly detected. 
For RESV message processing the code also stores the router ID and the LSP object 
ID. This is used for status reporting but also use to correlate PATH and RESV 
messages that belong to the same LSP.  The code then stores the label that has been 
assigned by the downstream router and reported by the subsequent upstream 
router. 
 Our security approach to LSP control plane tamper detection is dependent on 
hardening all Ingress and Egress routers associated with MPLS path setup.  Along 
with hardening the edge devices IPsec tunnels are created from each LER and LSR 
device to the distant Monitor.  This protects the reported signaling information from 
compromise prior to reaching the Monitor. If this procedure is followed then the 
security code can capture tampering even if there is adversarial code on routers 
reporting false information and routers participating in collusion.  This can all be 
detected because there is a high level of certainty that the first report originating 
from the Ingress router has not been tampered with.  Figure 7 shows a MPLS 
network scenario, which is the first level in the OPNET program, the Project level. 
This is where Nodes are placed and are connected to each other to form a network. 
There are several workstations, servers, switches, and routers, each connected with 
either a red or black line. These lines represent either a 100 Base T Ethernet 
connection (red), or a T1 or T3 connection (black). Workstations look like 
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workstations, while servers are the gray rectangles, switches are the gray squares, 
and the MPLS routers are the blue and green cylinders. The other lines that can be 
seen in various colors represent Label Switch Paths. 
Just above the network within the Project there are 5 icons, these are attribute 
boxes that are user interfaces to access specific network parameters that influence 
the behavior of the project objects. All of the objects within a project are selected 
from a pallet that allows you to select the objects as either generic or specific (i.e. 
Cisco) products. For example you can select a generic workstation, which is 
connected to a 3Com Switch, which in turn is connected to a Cisco router. 
 
 
Figure 7: Test Network Model 
 
To add to the assurance that reported information to the monitor has not been 
tampered with encryption in the form of IPsec tunnels are also included in the 
overall security architecture. 
5.2.4 Security Code Performance 
Whenever a new security practice or approach is introduced into a network system it 
is important to understand the impact of the new security implementation to the 
overall network under test.  To help characterize the system impact to our security 
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approach the following statistics, link congestion, VPN tunnel delay, and processor 
load where gathered to help measure and understand the system impact. 
5.2.4.1 Link Congestion 
Within the LSP security monitor architecture each LER or LSR link that is 
participating in the security monitoring of LSP’s must report all LSP signaling 
requests to the security monitor.  When this occurs a packet containing the signaling 
information, either PATH or RESV is routed through the network to the distant 
security monitor.  These packets create additional packet loading on the network 
links they traverse. This additional loading is a direct result of the implementation 
of the security architecture and has been simulated to gather information on its 
impact.   
                         
Figure 8: Simulated Throughput 
 
The size of the packet and the volume of packets represent the overall impact to the 
underlying network. Figure 8 shows the Bits/second link rate seen at the Security 
Monitor.  When this value is divided by the packet/second rate it reveals an average 
packet size of a LSP reporting message, Figure 9 shows the overall link capacity 
encountered when 50 LSPs are created through our network scenario as seen in 
Figure 7. 
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Figure 9: Simulated Aggregate Load for 50 LSPs (packets/sec) 
5.2.4.2 VPN Tunnel Delay 
Within the LSP security monitor architecture VPN’s are created from each 
participating LER or LSR to the security monitor device. These VPN’s are needed to 
prevent tampering with the control plane signaling information being sent to the 
monitor.  LSP information originated at the label switch devices (LER, LSR) is 
encapsulated into an encrypted tunnel. The impact to the data routed through an 
IPsec tunnel is the encryption delay into the tunnel and the decryption delay 
encountered when exiting the tunnel.  Simulations were run to determine the 
overall average tunnel delay encountered by LSP reporting data.  The actual data 
rate was based on the packet/second rate shown in the previous link congestion 
Figure 9. Figure 10 shows the average per packet tunnel delay. 
 37
               
Figure 10: Simulated Tunnel Delay 
5.2.4.3 Processor Load 
Another important statistic to gather about our security implementation is the 
impact to the computer processor on the security monitor that is hosting the tamper 
detection software. Statistics were gathered on the processor when 50 LSP’s , and 
their associated reporting packets, were generated based on the network scenario as 
shown in Figure 7.  Figure 11shows the overall CPU utilization for the monitor node 
based on our network scenario.  
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Figure 11: Simulated CPU Utilization 
 
5.3 Prototype Implementation 
  To help validate the architecture and it’s supporting security code a demonstration 
network was created as a proof of concept for many of the previously described 
attributes.   
5.3.1 RSVP Daemon for DiffServ over MPLS 
The MPLS Linux kernel code that is used for the demonstration network is an 
extension of the “MPLS for Linux” project on Source Forge, where DiffServ and 
RSVP-TE support was added. The Source Forge MPLS project concentrated on using 
LDP to setup LSPs in a network, whereas for this research we need RSVP-TE 
support instead. The program we officially used is titled “RSVP-TE daemon for 
DiffServ over MPLS under Linux” and is a Ph.D. project from INTEC Broadband 
Communication Networks (IBCN), an organization within the Faculty of Applied 
Science at the Gent University in Belgium. 
The current release of the daemon offers DiffServ over MPLS support, the use of 
multiple routing tables and LSP byte and packet counters. The daemon also offers 
an RSVP API that allows developers to build custom applications that can interact 
with the daemon. LSP rerouting and LSP protection switching is also supported. 
Netfilter is the part of the Linux Kernel that is used to classify the outgoing packets, 
the quality of service, and queuing for differentiating between flows. The RSVP 
daemon is responsible for the RSVP signaling, maintenance of the MPLS states, 
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allocation/installation of the MPLS labels during LSP setup, and freeing and 
removing labels on LSP tear down. 
For the demonstration network the daemon was compiled and run on six PCs 
running Red Hat Linux 7.1, kernel version 2.4. The only support that is offered for 
the daemon is either included in the source code or on the IBCN MPLS website. 
Table 1 presents some of the executables and configuration files used for the 
daemon. These specific files are referenced in scripts, described later, that were 
written to enable a monitoring process on the network. 
 
Executable Description 
rsvpd  MPLS daemon 
rapirecv_auto  Listens for MPLS packets 
rtest2  Sends out MPLS requests 
Tunnel  Maps protocols to LSPs 
label.conf 
 Configuration file that defines the label ranges for each 
interface 
lspconfig  Configuration file that defines an explicit or loose LSP. 
Table 1. Executables and configuration files for running DS/MPLS 
 
5.3.2 What is DiffServ? 
The importance of DiffServ is that it is a type of traffic control architecture for 
providing different types of service (ToS) for network traffic, which provides a Layer 
3 Quality of Service (QoS) solution. A router at the edge of the network identifies 
packets based on the IP precedence or on the DiffServ Code Point (DSCP) fields in 
the header. Network devices that support DiffServ use DSCP code points in the IP 
header to select a per-hop behavior (PHB) for a packet. In the case of the daemon the 
type of service is based on the value located in the EXP field in the MPLS header. 
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Figure 12: IP Header - Type of Service is circled 
 
The ToS field describes one entire byte (eight bits) of an IP packet. The six most 
significant bits of the ToS byte are now called the DiffServ field. The last two bits in 
the DiffServ field are used as Early Congestion Notification (ECN) bits. IP 
precedence uses three bits, while DSCP, an extension of IP precedence, uses six bits 
to select the PHB for the packet at each network node. For example if a packet is 
marked with a DSCP value of 000000 the PHB determines traditional “best effort” 
service from a DS-compliant node. If a packet arrives at a DS-compliant node and its 
DSCP value is not mapped to a PHB, it will get mapped to the default “best effort” 
PHB. The following Table shows the encoding for the ToS bytes. 
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Precedence Bits – DS5, DS4, DS3 
XXX00000 
 
111 = Network Control = Precedence 7  
110 = Internetwork Control = Precedence 6  
101 = CRITIC/ECP = Precedence 5  
100 = Flash Override = Precedence 4  
011 = Flash = Precedence 3  
010 = Immediate = Precedence 2  
001 = Priority = Precedence 1  
000 = Routine = Precedence 0 
 
Type of Service Bits – DS2, DS1, DS0 
000XXX00 
 
0000 = Normal Service 
1000 = Minimize delay 
0100 = Maximize Throughput 
0010 = Maximize Reliability 
0001 = Minimize Monetary Cost 
 
Early Congestion Notification Bits 
000000XX 
Currently Unused 
Table 2. Original IPv4 ToS byte 
 
There are specific definitions for the DSCP values that define the per-hop behavior 
for a packet. Expedited Forwarding (EF) PHB provides for a guaranteed bandwidth 
service, while Assured Forwarding (AFxy) PHB defines a method by which behavior 
aggregates can be given different forwarding assurances. The EF PHB (DSCP value 
of 101110) provides for a low-loss, low-latency, low-jitter, and assured bandwidth 
service [2], ideal for applications such as video streaming and Voice over IP.  
The Assured Forwarding (AFxy) PHB defines four AFx classes, AF1, AF2, AF3, and 
AF4. Each class is assigned a certain amount of buffer space and bandwidth, 
dependent on the service level agreement (SLA) with the Service Provider. Within 
each AFx class there are three different drop precedence values. Therefore, if there 
is congestion at a node on a specific link, and packets of a particular AFx class need 
to be dropped, packets in AFxy will be dropped such that AFx1 <= AFx2 <= AFx3. 
For a better understanding the following table shows the encoding for the AFxy 
classes and the drop precedence. 
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Drop 
Precedence  
Class 1  Class 2  Class 3  Class 4  
Low AF11 = 001010 AF21 = 010010 AF31 = 011010 AF41 = 100010 
Medium  AF12 = 001100 AF22 = 010100 AF32 = 011100 AF42 = 100100 
High AF13 = 001110 AF23 = 010110 AF33 = 011110 AF43 = 100110 
Table 3: DiffServ AF Code Point Table 
 
The daemon uses DSCP to assign quality of service attributes, which are then 
mapped to the EXP field in the MPLS header, and then is assigned to an LSP. Since 
the EXP field is only three bits long the daemon has a translation from DSCP to 
DiffServ/MPLS. What this means is that the Layer 3 QoS has been translated to 
Layer 2. DS/MPLS can then only support eight different types of service for an LSP, 
with one type of service dedicated to an explicitly routed LSP (E-LSP). The other 
seven are shortest path LSPs (L-LSP) that are setup in the network according to IP 
routing tables, and the DSCP signaling is encoded during LSP setup. Traffic can be 
mapped on the LSPs based on the destination address, protocol, destination port, 
and port ranges of the IP packets.  
 
5.3.3 Demonstration Network 
The MPLS demonstration network was setup with two “workstations”, two MPLS 
edge routers, three MPLS core routers, and a “monitor”. The two workstations are 
configured to communicate with each other across the network through the MPLS 
routers. The edge routers are where the LSPs are setup and torn down, while the 
core routers offer two different routes for the LSPs to be directed. Figure 13 is a 
graphical representation of the network showing how each computer is interfaced, 
along with the IP addresses, and arbitrary Spanish names given to differentiate 
between the PCs. The core MPLS routers are represented by the light green boxes, 
the edge routers are in light blue, and the monitor is in light yellow. 
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Figure 13: Network Diagram for MPLS Monitoring Demonstration 
 
A few scripts and a couple of programs have been written that will enable the user to 
remotely start the RSVP daemon and the logging of packets from one computer at 
the edge of the network, these are the routers Manuel or Miguel. A utility called 
netcmd was used to send commands remotely from an edge router to each of the 
other routers so that a user could start/stop/begin-logging MPLS by typing in only 
one command on one computer, instead of having to repeat that same command on 
each of the routers. For example, using the command netcmd start_mpls, would 
start rsvpd and rapirecv_auto on each of the routers. Then using netcmd 
mpls_logger, this would begin the logging process on each of the routers, and RSVP 
packets would be sent to the monitor when LSPs are setup across the network. The 
following table shows each of the scripts, located in /bin on all machines, and their 
corresponding description.  
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Script/Program Description 
 rsvp_monitor Located on Maria (monitor), logs the incoming packets from the 
MPLS routers and makes comparisons between PATH and RESV 
messages to detect changes. 
 monitor_mpls Starts ethereal with a bunch of options including the  
–f option to filter all RSVP and MPLS packets. 
 start_mpls Starts the RSVP daemon on all local machines. 
 mpls_logger Located on all the MPLS routers the program uses PCAP to log 
incoming packets, and then netcat is used to send the packets to the 
monitor. 
 kill_mpls Stops the MPLS rsvpd daemon. 
Table 4. MPLS scripts for logging packets to the monitor. 
 
The logging program, mpls_logger, which resides on each of the MPLS routers, uses 
PCAP to sniff incoming/outgoing packets on each of the interfaces and then sends a 
copy of the packet to a specific port on the monitor for processing. During logging, 
only RSVP packets are sniffed and sent to the monitor. Recall that there are only 
two different types of RSVP messages, PATH and RESV, so in the case of an LSP 
being setup across Manuel?Marco?Jose?Miguel there would be six packets for 
each type of RSVP message being sent to the monitor, for a total of twelve packets in 
the LSP that is setup. If an LSP were setup from Manuel to Miguel, through Pablo, 
then there would be 16 total RSVP packets sent to the monitor. 
5.3.3.1 Monitor Description 
When packets are logged on the MPLS routers and sent to the monitor, it has to 
“listen” for incoming packets on the specific ports that these packets are to be 
arriving. It is then tasked to put these packets in order, not in how they have 
arrived, but in the sequence for an LSP being setup across the routers. It is then the 
monitor’s responsibility to process the packets to ensure the control plane setup for 
an LSP hasn’t been compromised, and monitor LSP refresh messages that maintain 
the LSP. 
The rsvp_monitor program listens on eleven specific open ports (eleven ports for the 
different interfaces on the MPLS routers) for incoming packets from the routers. It 
then uses PCAP functions to read the packet information and compare the packets. 
The first comparison checks to make sure that what one router has sent to another 
is what the other has received. So for example, if Manuel sent a packet to Marco, the 
monitor would receive a packet from Manuel that was sent to Marco, and would also 
receive a packet from Marco that was received from Manuel, then compare the two 
packets to make sure they are identical (checking for “man-in-the-middle” attacks). 
This comparison process occurs for every link on an LSP, so for the LSP example in 
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the previous section there would be 6 comparisons for the twelve packets sent to the 
monitor for the LSP. 
After the comparisons have been completed the information is then passed to a 
different function in the program that arranges the PATH and RESV packets for the 
LSP. Once all PATH and RESV packets have been received the program matches 
each PATH message to its corresponding RESV message, checking for any changes 
in the fields, then prints to the display if the LSP setup was successful. Then the 
RESV messages are compared link by link to ensure labels or LSP ID’s haven’t been 
changed. 
The monitor was originally designed to display text messages to the console 
indicating when an LSP has been setup and display alerts when unexpected changes 
are made to the RSVP messages. This type of display can get to be a bore for a user 
of the program, just watching text scrolling on a console, so Open GL was used to 
display a graphical representation of the network, and graphically indicate warnings 
to the user when message fields have been changed. The demo shows five routers 
connected by links and when a change has been detected a link will flash red and a 
warning message will appear. 
5.3.3.2 Adversary Scenarios 
The same adversary scenarios that were used in the computer simulation were also 
attempted for the demonstration network, the first being changing the label field in 
the MPLS header. To do this the mpls_logger program was modified (or “hacked” in 
the adversarial world) so that when a RSVP packet was sniffed and about to be sent 
to the monitor the adversary code would read in the header information and change 
the necessary fields. The monitor would then receive its copy of the changed packet 
and would then have to determine if the field has been changed when it parses 
through the headers. 
Another type of adversarial attack is changing the quality of service attributes in the 
EXP field in the MPLS header. From the previous discussion about DiffServ there 
were specific definitions for the levels of QoS. In this case the adversary can 
manipulate the EXP field and change this attribute so that high priority is assigned 
to every packet/flow in the network, demanding higher bandwidth through the LSP. 
This would cause non-MPLS packets to get dropped, thus creating a denial of 
service. The adversary could do the opposite and assign a low priority to the packets, 
thus if a video streaming application was using the LSP it would experience a 
degradation in its service. 
The last adversarial attack is to divert traffic to another node by changing the 
Explicit Route Object in the MPLS header. To accomplish this, another script is used 
to change the lspconfig file which defines the LSP to be explicit or loose and which 
routers to take. This method has proven to be the most difficult of any of the other 
attacks because it relies on properly changing the configuration file during LSP 
setup, if the file is not formatted properly then the LSP never gets setup. 
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6 Conclusions and Future Work 
This project successfully developed an architecture for securing and monitoring 
control plane communications between MPLS LSRs and optical network switches. 
This security architecture addressed many threats that were identified during a 
security analysis that was conducted early in the project. The threats addressed by 
this architecture include modification of control plane messages by a malicious “man 
in the middle” and/or a compromised LSR. 
This architecture was successfully implemented as an OPNET simulation. This 
simulation generally showed that the architecture was feasible, and that it could 
scale to sizes that are appropriate for enterprise networks (e.g., Sandia’s networks). 
The OPNET implementation was successfully migrated to a real Linux-based 
implementation for laboratory experimentation and demonstrations. 
This architecture also contributed to security specifications in the Optical 
Internetworking Forum. Specifically, this project contributed to OIF specifications 
for using IPSec to secure control plane communications between optical switches, 
and auditing events in an optical network to detect possible malicious behavior. 
Finally, this project was also responsible for transfer of network control plane 
monitoring technology to Bytex Corporation. Bytex licensed network sensor and 
assessment software from Sandia to incorporate into their next-generation B-6000 
network monitoring appliance/firewall. 
At this point, the technology has been proven and transferred to industry. Therefore, 
future work will likely involve further implementation and deployment of the 
technology. Specific examples include: 
?? deployment into Sandia’s enterprise networks (e.g., using the Bytex B6000 
product) 
?? deployment into other networks for which Sandia has design responsibilities 
(e.g., external customer networks) 
?? development of enhanced MPLS sensors (e.g., sensors that perform 
sophisticated filtering) 
?? development or evaluation of reference implementations of the OIF 
specifications 
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